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Abstract 
 
This article shows how the social sciences, particularly human geography, rejected 
hard determinism by the mid-twentieth century partly on the deontological basis that 
it is irreconcilable with social justice, yet this rejection came just before a burst of 
creative development in consequentialist theories of social justice that problematize a 
facile rejection of determinism on moral grounds, a development that has seldom 
been recognized in the social sciences. Thus many current social science and human 
geography views on determinism and social justice are antiquated, ignoring 
numerous common and well-respected arguments within philosophy that hard 
determinism can be reconciled with a just society. We support this argument by 
briefly tracing the parallel development of stances on determinism in the social 
sciences and the deontological-consequentialist debate in philosophy. The purpose of 
the article is to resituate social science and human geography debates on 
determinism and social justice within a modern ethical framework. 
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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this article is to show that the social science rejection of hard 
determinism (which had an illogical [for deciding what is a factual question] but 
nevertheless important normative component), largely complete by the mid-twentieth 
century, came just before a burst of creative development in consequentialist theories 
of social justice that are conceivably consistent with determinism (because they do 
not rely on intent or free will), a resurgence that has seldom been recognized in the 
social sciences. Thus the current social science view of determinism and social justice 
is antiquated, ignoring numerous common and well-respected arguments within 
philosophy that hard determinism can be reconciled with a just society. This 
argument is important to all of the social sciences, but perhaps of particular relevance 
to human geography, where issues concerning determinism have been especially 
prominent in shaping the discipline.
1
 We support this argument with a purposefully 
concise
2
 tracing of the parallel development of stances on determinism in the social 
sciences/human geography and the deontological-consequentialist debate in 
                                                 
1
 The relationship between environment, society, and determinism has of course been central to 
geography throughout its early development (e.g., Montesquieu, Ratzel, Semple, Febvre, Vidal de la 
Blache, Huntington, Boas/Sauer etc.) and remained central through the mid-twentieth century (e.g., 
Montefiore and Williams 1955, Spate 1957; see also Sprout and Sprout 1965 for an interesting parallel 
discussion outside of geography). Determinism remained important through its role in discussions of 
laws, probabilistic causality, and explanation (e.g., Harvey 1969) and at times appeared in the radical 
and cultural turns (e.g., Peet 1985). Questions hinging on determinism continue to be important to 
geography, for example in Merrett 2003 and Coombes and Barber 2005, as well as in work by 
development economists such as Gallup et. al. 2003 (Is Geography Destiny?). Ballinger 2008a, Ch. 6, 
Section 2 discusses methodological reasons why despite the strong desire by many geographers and 
social scientists more generally to avoid making metaphysical assumptions concerning determinism in 
explanation, it is not possible to do so.  
2
 This is in order to avoid overwhelming the main point of the article with the vast and contested 
literature and endless possible digressions concerning these subjects. Once the main point is 
understood, then of course future, more detailed debate is possible. 
 3 
philosophy. The article concludes with a brief consideration of deterministic 
consequentialist ethics, social justice, and the problems of egoism and altruism.  
Any argument concerning moral considerations and determinism in the social 
sciences logically would be this brief: It is not logical to answer factual questions on 
normative grounds.  
However, this has indeed been done (as we have had difficulty convincing 
philosophers less familiar with the social sciences; there is a small representation 
from the numerous examples in the social sciences included here). The illogical 
outcome of weighing in on what is a factual question based on moral reasoning seems 
to be due to the inherently moral component built into the social sciences from their 
earliest beginnings. For example, John Horgan recently observes:  'In the early 19th 
century, the French visionary Auguste Comte proposed a scientific chain of being, 
ranging from the physical sciences at the bottom up through biology to the "queen" of 
sciences, sociologie, at the top. A science of human social behavior, Comte 
contended, could help humanity make moral and political decisions and construct 
more efficient, just governments.' (Horgan 2011). The consensus seems to have been: 
If the social sciences have at base a normative component, and determinism is 
believed to be incompatible with morality—and besides, scientists were saying the 
world is indeterministic anyway (Hacking 1983; quantum physics in general) then 
why not object to determinism, even citing moral repugnance, despite the illogicality 
of deciding a factual question based on normative grounds?  
 
 4 
Before continuing we should note that the determinism we discuss is hard 
determinism as defined below,
3
 and that a similar argument could be made replacing 
our emphasis on consequentialism with an emphasis on compatibilism, viz., that the 
many modern developments in theories of compatibilism also problematize the 
traditional social science moral rejection of determinism. We do not pursue this 
possibility because we do not find compatibilist arguments convincing—we doubt 
there is a way to reconcile a meaningful concept of free will with determinism. 
Nevertheless, compatibilist theories also call into question the self-assuredness of the 
social science moral rejection of determinism.
4
 
Also, we should be clear that our argument does not hinge on an argument that 
within philosophy consequentialist ethics have become more influential than 
                                                 
3
 We use a common definition of determinism in Vihvelin (2003, para. 5): ‘the thesis that a complete 
description of the state of the world at any time t and a complete statement of the laws of nature 
together entail every truth about what happens at every time later than t. Alternatively, and using the 
language of possible worlds: Determinism is true at a possible world w iff the following is true at that 
world: Any world which has the same laws of nature as w and which is exactly like w at any time t is 
exactly like w at all times which are future relative to t’. The high degree of acceptance of a moral 
rejection to determinism in the social sciences (Section 2 below) demonstrates that most social 
scientists are libertarian incompatibilists, i.e., (metaphysical) libertarians and the determinism they 
object to ‘hard’ determinism. That is, they do not believe free will and determinism are compatible and 
so are not compatibilists, and since they believe in free will they reject incompatibilist hard 
determinism (the belief in determinism at the expense of free will). 
4
 It is important to note that, confusingly, the view is sometimes found (e.g., Mason 2005, 344) that 
compatibilism is determinism compatible with morals rather than the more common view that 
compatibilism is determinism compatible with free will and thus morals. We believe the former view 
makes it difficult to distinguish between several common combinations of determinism, free will, and 
morals: 1) (hard) determinism with no free will and no morals, 2) (hard) determinism with no free will 
but that is somehow moral (or more precisely, ethical, with an ethics emerging from the self-interested 
actions of many individuals, discussed in Section 3.1) and 3) determinism with free will and thus also 
morals. It seems clearer to consider the first two of these both ‘hard determinism’ (and then debate the 
possibility of an ethical hard determinism) and the last of these as ‘compatibilism’. Of course, it may 
not matter – Koons (2002), for example, argues that in practice an ethical hard determinism and 
compatibilism are identical. 
 5 
deontological approaches in the last half century. In fact, the reverse is probably true. 
However, measuring their relative influence is not relevant to the argument at hand. 
What is important is that there has been an explosion in views on ethics (both 
consequentialist and deontological) since the mid-twentieth century, and among these 
are numerous new or refined consequentialist approaches that are highly relevant to 
social science assumptions yet have not received sufficient attention in the social 
sciences. It is perhaps time to reexamine social science assumptions and moral 
stances towards determinism given these developments.
5
  
 
Why bother with determinism at all when the physical sciences seem to have 
shown that even the world of physics is indeterministic, much less the biological and 
social realms? Simply because it is not nearly as clear that physics has shown the 
world to be indeterministic as one might think if reading only social science 
references to quantum physics. In fact, even the standard interpretation (i.e., not just 
heterodox interpretations such as the oft-cited Bohm interpretation) of quantum 
mechanics by no means incontrovertibly shows that the universe is fundamentally 
indeterministic. In a careful survey of the topic asking the question ‘If we believe 
modern physics, is the world deterministic or not?’ John Earman concludes that ‘there 
is no simple and clean answer’ (Earman 2004, 43). After a similar survey on 
indeterminism in neurobiology, Marcel Weber concludes that ‘for the time being it is 
necessary to set the record straight on indeterminism in neurobiology. At present, its 
prospects are not good’ (Weber 2005, 672). And while there has been a pronounced 
emphasis on free will and agency in the social sciences in the last half century, 
without a neurological basis for indeterminism it seems difficult to account for where 
something truly ‘free’ enters into the question of human action. Even if there is 
                                                 
5
 Richardson and Bishop 2002 represents an effort to develop more sophisticated approaches to the 
consideration of determinism in the social sciences, although with a focus on psychology and a 
‘hermeneutic’ perspective on ethics that ultimately does not seem to address (beyond embracing the 
communitarianism of Etzioni [1996] and similar perspectives) the fundamental contradictions many 
see between social justice and determinism. 
 6 
ontological chance in quantum physics, this may not ‘percolate up’ and make the 
biological realm indeterministic (see, for example, Millstein 2000 and 2003, 
especially on the concept of ‘asymptotic determinism’). With no appeal to free will, 
some combination of nature and nurture and their astonishingly complex interplay 
may be sufficient to account for human action.
6
 
In recent decades, due in part to positions on supervenience and physicalism, 
doubts about free will have been common among philosophers, especially the 
(metaphysical) libertarian free will that pervades the social sciences. Koons notes that 
‘[m]ost philosophers now concede that libertarianism has failed as an account of free 
will’ (Koons 2002, 81) and Smilansky that ‘metaphysical or libertarian free will, is 
highly contentious and, as many believe even incoherent. To pin the hopes of 
egalitarianism on libertarian free will would be suicidal’ (Smilansky, unpublished, 4). 
Comparing these views with those on free will and agency in the social sciences gives 
an idea of the divergence of the social sciences from many modern philosophical 
perspectives on free will. In sociology, for example, Wright notes that ‘the last few 
decades have witnessed a pronounced shift in thinking towards agency arguments. 
Over the last 25 years, a variety of theoretical perspectives—including 
                                                 
6
 When, if one looks for the precise details beyond a vague ‘free will’ for what motivates human 
action in philosophical and ethical discussions (if they are mentioned at all, which often they are not), 
one finds only nature, nurture, or some combination of both as the motivators. As just one example, in 
Rawls’ A Theory of Justice (1971) humans are morally motivated by ‘nature’ e.g. (all emphases 
added), ‘the effort a person is willing to make is influenced by his natural abilities and skills…The 
better endowed are more likely, other things equal, to strive conscientiously, and there seems to be no 
way to discount for their greater good fortune’ (312) and ‘Moral learning is…the free development of 
our innate intellectual and emotional capacities according to their natural bent’ (459). Alongside 
these ‘nature’ causes of human action, ‘nurture’ causes are found, e.g., ‘the willingness to make an 
effort, to try, and so to be deserving in the ordinary sense is itself dependent upon happy family and 
social circumstances’ (74) and ‘by the approbation and disapprobation of parents and of others in 
authority’ (458). Both nature and nurture combined can be found as well: ‘moral sentiments are likely 
to bear the scars of this early training which shapes more or less roughly our original nature’ (459). 
There is no appeal when the details of human action are considered, however, to any causes of human 
action other than nature and nurture. 
 7 
ethnomethodology, hermeneutics, phenomenology, rational choice theory, the 
sociology of knowledge, the sociology of sociology, and structuration theory—have 
caused a virtual transformation toward agency in sociology’ (Wright 1995, 8).
7
 In the 
social sciences determinism has been replaced with what David Harvey speaks of as a 
ubiquitous ‘triumphalist humanism that underlies so-called ‘possibilist’ doctrines of 
economic development and change’ (Harvey 2001, 228). Arguing against 
‘sociocultural evolutionism’ Bryant reiterates the view, widespread in the social 
sciences, that agency and free-will mean that we must study the social realm as ‘in 
Durkheim’s classic formulation, a reality sui generis, a distinctive and emergent ontic 
plane that requires its own indigenous categories and principles of explanation’ 
(Bryant 2001, 468). Simply put, there is a substantial disconnect between the 
conviction with which a majority of social scientists hold (metaphysical) libertarian 
views of free will based on assumptions concerning social justice and determinism 
and the multiplicity of views that have developed within philosophy in the last half 
century concerning social justice and determinism. 
Section 2 supports the main contention of this article through a (purposefully 
brief) tracing of the development of stances on determinism in the social sciences and 
the parallel deontological-consequentialist debate in philosophy. We show how the 
social sciences first rejected determinism on moral grounds and then subsequently 
ignored the numerous later developments in consequentialist ethics that might have 
undermined the self-assuredness of this rejection. Section 3 concludes the main 
argument, and is followed by a short consideration (Section 3.1) that outlines views 
on how deterministic consequentialist theories might conceivably be argued to 
account for the development of a just society. Section 4 considers some further 
possible objections to the argument. 
 
                                                 
7
 We are aware that there are arguments that distinguish free will from agency. However, this does 
not affect the discussion here. Where agency is used synonymously with free will it falls within the 
scope of this discussion. Where it is explicitly defined as something other than free will, then it does 
not.  
 8 
2. The Deontological - Consequentialist Debate in Philosophy and the 
Moral Rejection of Determinism in the Social Sciences 
Deontologism is an ethics based on moral obligations and intent (and thus free 
will), traditionally contrasted with utilitarianism (since the mid-twentieth century 
more broadly conceived of as ‘consequentialism’, the belief that it is the 
consequences of actions that matter rather than intent). Because consequentialist 
ethics do not rely on intent or free will they are conceivably consistent with hard 
determinism (although consequentialists do not necessarily believe hard determinism 
to be true) while the moral basis of deontological ethics makes them fundamentally 
opposed to hard determinism. The deontological-consequentialist debate was long 
defined by Kant and Locke (deontological) and Bentham, J.S. Mill, and later 
Sidgwick (utilitarian) from the seventeenth to the mid-twentieth century. 
2.1 The early twentieth century rejection of determinism in the social sciences 
While within philosophy the deontological-consequentialist debate developed the 
‘social sciences’ began to emerge in the nineteenth century. Various strands of the 
young social sciences incorporated ideas viewed as deterministic, especially 
environmental/geographical determinism and various types of biological determinism 
(Social Darwinism, ‘nature’ views of the mind). We will focus on 
geographical/environmental and biological determinism here. Although other uses of 
the term ‘determinism’ are also frequently encountered in the social sciences, such as 
‘technological determinism’, ‘economic determinism’, ‘cultural determinism’ and so 
forth (and more generally in recent decades, ‘social constructionism’) these are 
clearly not really examples of determinism; it is evident that economies, cultures, 
technology etc. are each influenced by myriad other factors and are thus not 
themselves ultimately determinate - technology is clearly in part ‘caused’ by culture, 
 9 
economies changed by technology, culture by economics and so on (in what might be 
called ‘circular endogeneity’).
8
  
The various strands of determinism, especially environmental and biological 
determinism, found in the young social sciences began to be rejected in the early 
twentieth century, a process virtually complete by mid-century. By 1951 geographical 
determinism could already be declared ‘as dead as the dodo’ (Dickinson 1951, 6). 
Likewise with biological determinism, whose rejection ‘reached its zenith in the 
1950s, in the aftermath of the Nazi atrocities, but in some corners of philosophical 
inquiry [its rejection] took hold much earlier. In psychiatry the fashion was turning 
against biological explanations around 1900’ (Ridley 2003, 98). 
Although there was an important boost to the rejection of determinism in the 
social sciences from quantum physics, again and again we find moral reasons for the 
rejection of environmental and biological determinism.
9
 The moral objection is clear 
                                                 
8
 It seems that it is precisely the prima facie plausibility of environment or biology to be ultimate 
causes determinate of later social development that accounts both for their attraction and repudiation. 
This prima facie plausibility is evident, for example, in the way that environmental and biological 
determinism circle back to the issue of free will through the question of human action and the 
‘nature’(biology)/’nurture’(environment) debate, where human action has time and again been 
suggested (or feared) to be ultimately caused by either environment or biology.
 
We cannot help but 
point out the inconsistency of the rejection of environmental influence in the study of society as 
‘environmental determinism’ and the simultaneous widespread embrace by social scientists of 
environmental influence within the nature/nurture debate. 
9
 The development of quantum physics would also reinforce the rejection of determinism. However, 
as evidenced by the quotes in this paper and many more like them, overall in the social sciences one 
finds more and earlier examples of the rejection of determinism on moral grounds than on the basis of 
quantum physics. The other most common objection to determinism is that it is overly simplistic to 
attempt to explain highly complex outcomes as deterministically resulting from relatively simple 
earlier factors such as geography (e.g., the Lewis and Wigen quote below). Accepting this viewpoint, 
however, obscures precisely what is one of the most interesting aspects of explanation – explaining the 
emergence of complex outcomes from relatively simple antecedent states. For a discussion of the 
importance of explanation of complex outcomes arising deterministically from simple initial 
conditions see Ballinger 2008b.  
 10 
in the wording of objections to geographical and environmental determinism, which 
are ‘treated as part of geography’s distant and shameful past’ (Frenkel 1992, 144), 
‘remembered with shame’ (Godlewska, 1993, 550) and equated with ‘Original Sin’ 
(Buttimer 1990, 16). ‘Of all the various chapters in the development of modern 
geography, none has been more disparaged, indeed vilified than the discipline’s 
relatively brief engagement with the doctrine of environmental or geographical 
determinism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries’ (Bassin 1992, 3). Likewise, 
moral reasons lay at the heart of the social science rejection of biological 
determinism: ‘During most of the twentieth century “determinism” was a term of 
abuse, and genetic determinism was the worst kind of term’ (Ridley 2003, 98). Views 
such as those of Isaiah Berlin on determinism became conventional wisdom, that it 
‘had dangerous moral and political consequences, justifying suffering and 
undermining respect for the “losers” of history. A belief in determinism served as an 
“alibi” for evading responsibility and blame, and for committing enormities in the 
name of necessity or reason.’ (Cherniss and Hardy 2006). Indeed, the moral objection 
to hard determinism is still so strong that even within philosophy ‘many philosophers 
seem to reject it not because of its philosophical implausibility, but because they fear 
the consequences of its being true.’ (Koons 2002, 81). 
2.2 1950s to the present: Determinism as dead letter 
From mid-century to the present little has changed in positions in the social 
sciences on determinism. Geographical determinism is rarely encountered, viewed as 
it is as an idea long ago rejected. For example, Lewis and Wigen (1997) admonish: 
For late twentieth-century Americans to sustain belief in a sweeping fit between 
cultural and natural features requires turning a blind eye to the most basic findings 
of geographical research….Human history is no more molded by the rigid 
framework of landmasses and ocean expanses than it is determined by the 
distribution of ‘ideal climates’ (Lewis and Wigen 1997, 45, 46).  
A modern paper that ventures to consider how geographical factors might 
influence economic outcomes (Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger 1999) is condemned (in 
 11 
the inaugural issue of a journal, no less, whose stated goal is to ‘reinvigorate the 
intersection between economics and geography’) as ‘breath-taking environmental and 
spatial determinism’ that should be corrected by other scholars, i.e., geographers that 
‘have at least as much to teach economists as they have to learn’ (Sheppard 2001, 
135), apparently meaning the conventional wisdom rejection of geographical 
determinism and that environmental factors are off limits in the study of society. 
Tellingly, this rejection comes immediately after a call to ‘avoid the temptation to 
dismiss out of hand what [one is] skeptical of’ (Sheppard 2001, 135). Environmental 
determinism is clearly considered so thoroughly rejected that this admonition does 
not apply to it. 
Similarly, biological views of society such as evolutionary psychology are still 
widely rejected for their determinism. Deterministic evolutionary psychology with its 
‘stress on human universals and on innate behavioral differences between the sexes 
simultaneously conflicts both with the left’s current preoccupation with diversity and 
multiculturalism, and with its feminism.’ (Grosvenor 2002, 436). Thus impeached, 
evolutionary psychologists themselves even seek exoneration from the epithet of 
determinism: ‘Neither Dawkins nor any other sane biologist would ever dream of 
proposing that human behavior is deterministic’ (Pinker 2002, 112). 
The modern rejection of determinism has not only continued since the 1950s. It 
has remained based on the same moral reasoning of the early twentieth century. Like 
Sachs’ work mentioned above, the few forays into what are considered deterministic 
arguments that do occur are attacked, sometimes vehemently, in a way only moral 
indignation can provoke. For example, Jared Diamond, like Sachs, suggests 
environmental factors are important in economic development. This ‘deterministic’ 
explanation of global development patterns is chastised as a ‘pernicious book’ that 
except for the popular attention it has received ‘would not ordinarily merit scholarly 
discussion’ (Sluyter 2003, 813). Diamond’s (deterministic) ‘junk science’ is seen as 
so morally dangerous that it ‘demands vigorous intellectual damage control’ (Sluyter 
2003, 813). Kaplan can write ‘And of all the unsavory truths in which [international 
relations] realism is rooted, the bluntest, most uncomfortable, and most deterministic 
of all is geography.’ (Kaplan, 2009, 97). Regarding biological determinism, Pinker 
 12 
notes that ‘[t]o acknowledge [a perceived deterministic] human nature, many think, is 
to endorse racism, sexism, war, greed, genocide, nihilism, reactionary politics, and 
neglect of children and the disadvantaged… Any claim that the mind has an innate 
organization strikes people not as a hypothesis that might be incorrect but as a 
thought it is immoral to think’ (Pinker 2002, viii). ‘Progressive’ or ‘left’ intellectuals 
interpret ‘deterministic’ evolutionary psychology ‘as part of the broader assault on 
collectivism and on the prospects for more cooperative and egalitarian social models’ 
(Grosvenor 2002 436) and view determinism ‘as a flawed scientific rationalization of 
prevailing [unethical] social hierarchies.’ (Grosvenor 2002, 438).
10
 The eminent 
primatologist Sarah Hrdy even questions ‘whether sociobiology should be taught at 
the high-school level…Unless a student has a moral framework already in place, we 
could be producing social monsters by teaching this.’ (quoted in Barash, 2006, B13). 
2.3 The mid-century reinvigoration of ethics 
The period following the early- to mid-twentieth century demise of geographical 
and biological determinism in the social sciences saw a remarkable reinvigoration of 
the study of ethics and related issues of social justice among philosophers and 
political theorists. This resurgence in part was stimulated by G.E.M. Anscombe’s 
influential article ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ (1958) which both introduced the term 
‘consequentialism’ now used to describe the broad range of ideas descended from 
                                                 
10
 Although overt rejection of determinism on moral grounds is frequently from the ‘left’, we do not 
mean to imply that determinism is somehow morally accepted by the ‘right’ (nor, by extension, that 
our views are somehow on the ‘right’). Indeed, the almost total banishment of the concept from the 
modern social sciences is likely due precisely to the fact that its rejection is one of the few areas where 
both right and left seem to be in agreement. The religious right objects to determinism (and its twin 
concept, reductionism, see Wacome 2004) based on beliefs that it undermines religion, while they as 
well as the conservative and social right (e.g., Berlin, Hayek) and (political) libertarians reject strongly 
to the determinism that was frequently associated with totalitarian regimes (Nazi, Stalinist, etc.) and 
with Marxism. In the twentieth century, determinism had few friends, and, remarkably and almost 
uniquely among scientific ideas, was reviled by social scientists of virtually all political persuasions, 
left and right. 
 13 
classic utilitarianism and introduced a ‘virtue ethics’ as an alternative to both 
deontologism and consequentialism. A number of important consequentialist 
viewpoints followed, such as Smart (1961), Hare (1963), Lyons (1965) and Bayles 
(1968). Contemporaneously a type of consequentialism known as ‘rule 
consequentialism’ was also developed, according to Hooker (2003) first clearly 
formulated by Urmson (1953) and Brandt (1959). Little over a decade after 
Anscombe’s seminal article another work widely considered one of the most 
important treatises on normative ethics and social justice since the period of Kant and 
Locke was published, Rawls’ A Theory of Justice (1971). This extraordinarily 
influential work increased still further the attention to social justice and topics related 
to the deontological-consequentialist debate that had already noticeably increased in 
the period since Anscombe’s article. 
3. Discussion: Modern Consequentialism and Social Justice 
We have briefly outlined how, since the mid-twentieth century rejection of 
determinism on moral grounds in the social sciences, numerous consequentialist 
theories of ethics and social justice (consistent with hard determinism because they do 
not rely on intent or free will) flourished while the social sciences nevertheless 
rejected determinism as if these did not exist. We should note (as Rawlsian 
approaches so pervasively shape modern debates on ethics) that Rawls himself 
considered his argument to be in opposition to utilitarian arguments. Nevertheless, A 
Theory of Justice stimulated still further attention to ethics and the development of 
consequentialist ideas, leading to still more nuanced and robust consequentialist 
viewpoints (Shaw 1999 provides a readable yet thorough modern overview and 
defense of utilitarianism). Furthermore, it is debatable whether or not Rawlsian 
approaches to ethics are truly anti-consequentialist. As just one example, note the 
common observation that Rawls justifies income inequalities based on the benefits 
(consequences) they incur. More generally, ostensibly deontological ethics might be 
considered consequentialist in the sense they are ultimately judged ‘good’ due to their 
positive consequences for society. On the historical and institutional view 
 14 
deontological moral ‘rules’ might just be entrenched customs that became judged as 
good based on long forgotten consequentialist grounds. Even Kantian ethics, 
traditionally considered the epitome of deontologism, might be interpreted as 
consequentialist for these and other reasons (Cummiskey 1990, Hare 1997). Indeed, 
Portmore (2007) argues that all deontological theories can (and should) be 
‘consequentialized’. (There are also arguments that Kant can be interpreted as a 
compatibilist, e.g. Hudson 1994; Vilhauer 2004 further discusses this argument). 
Additionally, Anscombe’s ‘virtue ethics’ have seen the development of at least one 
deterministic variant, (Slote 1990), and Smilansky even argues for ‘The ethical 
advantages of hard determinism’, the title of his (1994). 
In light of these and many related developments and possibilities regarding 
consequentialism it would seem that the self-assuredness of the social science 
rejection of determinism on moral grounds is misleading and irresponsible. Bald 
assertions that determinism is incompatible with social justice, so common in the 
social sciences, are misleading because they give the appearance that this is 
undisputed when this is far from the truth. They are irresponsible when they ignore 
the scores of contrary arguments that are, if not universally accepted, at least well-
respected by experts on ethics, justice, and free will. To authoritatively reject 
determinism on moral grounds one would need to demonstrate that deontological 
arguments are superior to consequentialist arguments.
11
 However, consequentialist 
arguments clearly remain on equal footing with deontological arguments among 
philosophers and political theorists. The numerous developments in consequentialist 
theories of social justice compel the conscientious social scientist to remain at least 
agnostic on the issue of determinism and ethics in the social sciences. 
                                                 
11
 Alternatively, as noted in Section 2, social scientists might base their rejection of determinism on 
other arguments such as 1) quantum indeterminacy or 2) as being overly simplistic.  However, 1) the 
most comprehensive recent considerations of physics and determinism find no clear reason to believe 
modern physics shows the world to be either deterministic or indeterministic and 2) as Ballinger 2008b 
discusses, there have been recent developments in physics and other fields that demonstrate the 
plausibility of the deterministic development of the complexity of the world from the simplest of initial 
conditions. 
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3.1 A Note on Social Justice and Determinism 
 
The purpose of this essay has been to show that there are many respected 
arguments for consequentialist ethics (which are potentially consistent with hard 
determinism because they do not rely on intent or free will) and that these are 
irresponsibly ignored by social scientists. Thus our purpose has not been to actually 
defend the possibility of a consequentialist ethics. However, the reader might 
reasonably ask: How might there be a just society when individuals are not 
responsible for their actions in the sense implied by the concept of free will, and are 
motivated only by self-interest? There is of course no space to fully consider this 
question here, but it is perhaps useful to highlight a few relevant points. 
To consider how there might be a just society without resorting to deontologism 
and free will, let us consider two fundamental deontological criticisms of 
consequentialism. One way in which consequentialism can be divided is into 
individual-oriented consequentialism, i.e., egoism, and group-oriented 
consequentialism, such as classical utilitarianism (‘the greatest good for the greatest 
number’). Deontologists argue that neither of these can be just without morals. Under 
egoism there is no room for altruistic behavior and cooperation; society would be 
under the proverbial ‘law of the jungle’. Conversely, in group-oriented 
consequentialism there would be no moral ‘brakes’ on what an individual is expected 
to sacrifice for society. This is the classic ‘organ transplant’ argument: that society 
would be justified in sacrificing an individual to use their organs in order to save five 
others.
12
 
                                                 
12
 Many of the arguments of this article could be written in terms of concepts of criminal law and 
justice. In such a paper the ‘organ transplant’ type argument and its political ramifications would be 
well represented by C.S. Lewis’ well-known (1953). More generally, the significance of 
consequentialist (preventive) and deontological (retributive) concepts of justice are very well laid out 
in Robinson (1987) and citations therein. Robinson (2001) makes an interesting and subtle argument 
for why these concepts of criminal law should be both explicit and separately administered.  
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The problem of altruism is especially difficult for a non-deontological 
understanding of society. Early responses by evolutionary psychologists were based 
on kinship, with apparently altruistic acts actually a way of assuring the success of a 
genetic lineage. However, these were criticized for not being able to account for the 
full extent to which large, non-kinship based societies cooperate. From these early 
efforts explanations of altruism have developed and become both more nuanced and 
more engaged with and by the philosophical debate on morals (evident, for example 
in Joyce 2006 and de Waal 2006, the latter which includes responses by philosophers 
Peter Singer, Christine Korsgaard, and Philip Kitcher). Recently there has been the 
development of the concept of ‘altruistic punishment’ that sheds some light on the 
problem of prosocial behavior (e.g., Fehr and Gächter 2002; Boyd et. al. 2003; Gintis 
et. al. 2003; Fowler 2005. For a critique of Ferh’s work on altruism and its 
significance for the social sciences see Peacock 2007). The long line of game 
theoretic approaches to altruistic behavior, whose promise was already being realized 
in works such as Skyrms (1996) are developing apace (e.g., Binmore 2005). The 
ferment in the study of altruism and cooperation makes this aspect of consequentialist 
ethics especially dynamic at this time. As with the social science rejection of 
determinism on moral grounds, this does not mean social scientists should not reject 
consequentialism because of the problem of altruism. But it does make it 
irresponsible to imply consequentialist theories must be rejected based on altruism 
when this is an ongoing area of research that is making significant advances. 
This brings us to group-oriented consequentialism and the objection that there is 
no limit to how much society is justified in expecting individuals to sacrifice for the 
greater good. In the real world it is relatively easy to imagine how self-interest tends 
to work against this criticism. Much of the story of institutional and democratic 
development and enfranchisement is the story of individuals struggling to protect 
themselves from tyranny, including tyranny of the majority. Few if any accounts of 
the development of the institutions we associate today with a just society argue that 
these developed because pre-democratic states, empires, feudal lords, warlords, 
despots, kleptocracies, plutocracies, theocracies, or demagogues relinquished power 
or wealth because it was morally right. In accounts of the development of subsequent, 
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relatively more just systems of representational government and institutions ranging 
from Marxist accounts (e.g. Moore 1966; Brenner 1976; Therborn 1977) to (political) 
libertarian (e.g. Hayek 1973; Benson 1991) to institutional, neoclassical, rational 
choice and other accounts (e.g. Elias 1939; Downs 1957; Olson 1965; North and 
Thomas 1973; Tilly 1975, 1990; Mann 1993; Spruyt 1994, 2002; Powelson 1994; 
Allum 1995; Ertman 1997; De Soto 2000; Acemoglu and Robinson 2005; Boix 2006; 
Greif 2006) morality plays no role. It does not seem to be the case that we must 
appeal to morals to see why individuals have struggled to limit utilitarian excesses. 
Hedonism will do. 
 
4. Conclusion: Some Further Possible Objections 
A frequent comment on early drafts of this paper was that we are in error in 
treating the social sciences as a ‘unitary or unified enterprise’. Of course the social 
sciences are made up of many fields, each marked by a vast array of different 
viewpoints and approaches. However, despite a long and wide-ranging review of this 
topic we have not found evidence of there being substantial amounts of variation on 
this issue (determinism) in the social sciences. Indeed, a complacent lack of diversity 
is precisely what motivates the article. Notably, the comments mentioned above were 
supplied without any evidence or examples that any significant areas of the modern 
social sciences have as basic assumptions any perspectives other than such common 
anti-deterministic views such as probabilistic causality in explanation, the 
contradiction between morality and determinism and so on. Among modern orthodox 
and/or important heterodox social science - especially geographic - traditions there do 
not seem to be substantial deviations from our characterization of social science 
views concerning determinism. In their absence and (especially) in the interest of 
brevity we have purposefully treated the social sciences as a whole regarding this 
particular issue. 
Another possible misunderstanding - this paper is not about determinism per se, 
nor a paper about deontology/consequentialism per se. It is a comparison of the 
differing trajectories of thought on these issues in two different disciplines that we 
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hope illuminates key assumptions, assumptions especially important to human 
geography. For this reason we have provided the briefest description of these ideas 
possible in the interest of conciseness and clarity. Anything more would risk the 
article becoming unnecessarily bogged down in what are vast and disputed literatures 
on determinism, ethics and so on.
13
 We only want to show the relatively simple yet 
nonetheless important way in which there developed enough of a consensus on these 
issues in the social sciences to preclude consideration in the social sciences of 
important, relevant, and more recent developments concerning these issues among 
philosophers and political theorists.  
This brings us to a last point - relevance. If our aim is so limited, what is the value 
of the article at all? It lies in the fact that the (usually unspoken) assumptions 
concerning determinism and indeterminism are of (frequently unrecognized) critical 
importance to the interpretation of arguments across the social sciences, e.g., general 
versus token causation (Sayer 2000), understanding the difference between chaos and 
complexity (Manson 2001), interpretations of counterfactuals in history and the social 
sciences (Tetlock and Belkin 1996, Ferguson 1997), frequentist statistics and the 
meaning of significance levels in geography, sociology and other disciplines (Berk 
and Freedman 2001), and interpretations of path dependency in economic geography, 
history, and other disciplines (what does it mean to say development outcomes ‘could 
have been different’?) (Goldstone 1998, Mahoney 2001). Many of these problems are 
especially relevant to human geography. Without a more comprehensive familiarity 
with and appreciation of the degree of heterogeneity in modern philosophy regarding 
determinism, social scientists and human geographers may not only be interpreting 
their findings incorrectly, but doing so uniformly in the same direction, with all of the 
dangers to scholarship that such a consensus implies. 
                                                 
13
 We want to also make clear that this article is not intended as a literature review. The overviews 
presented are only meant to convey a general impression of common views on determinism and ethics 
in the fields and time periods we discuss. There is no intent for this paper to be a survey of these topics 
or disciplines other than to make a particular point concerning determinism, deontology, and the social 
sciences. 
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